Explicit Representation and Retrieval of Contextual Knowledge for Real-World Agents ∗ by Roy M. Turner
Explicit Representation and Retrieval of Contextual Knowledge
for Real-World Agents∗
Roy M. Turner
Department of Computer Science
University of Maine
Orono, ME 04469–5752
rmt@umcs.maine.edu
Abstract
For several years, our laboratory has worked on representing
and using contextual knowledge to control real-world agents,
for example, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). Our
approach, called context-mediated behavior (CMB), repre-
sents contexts as ﬁrst-class objects called contextual schemas
(c-schemas). Each represents a class of situation in which the
agent may ﬁnd itself, and it contains knowledge about how
the agent should behave in that context. C-schemas are also
instrumental in memory organization, forming the indexing
structures of a content-addressable memory. Retrieval is aug-
mented with a diagnostic process to ﬁnd the appropriate set
of c-schemas for a situation, which are then merged to create
a coherent view of the context. Currently, we are extend-
ing our approach to handle more complex kinds of planning
and acting and for use in multiagent systems (e.g., to pro-
vide context-appropriate ways to organize and reorganize the
agents). This workshop paper gives an overview of the work,
including the current status and future plans.
It is generally agreed that context plays an important part
in controlling a natural agent’s behavior, and that it should
play a similar role for artiﬁcial agents. Indeed, it is difﬁcult
to imagine appropriate behavior without some notion of the
context in which the behavior occurs.
Natural agents seem to take context into account automat-
ically when selecting behavior. For example, a person re-
sponds differently to the sound of a car horn depending on
whether he or she is driving, crossing a street on foot, or sit-
ting at a sidewalk caf´ e. A person who is an avid biker still
does not consider riding his or her bike on a train, even if the
bike is aboard. A person entering a library or church auto-
matically lowers his or her voice without conscious thought.
Somewhat paradoxically, although much context-
sensitive behavior is automatic and unconscious, humans
are able to reason about the context if need be. For example,
a person can enumerate things that are appropriate to do
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in the library and things that are not, and he or she can list
attributes of such contexts.
Although one should not blindly mimic nature in artifacts
(jets are better ﬂying machines than ornithopters, for exam-
ple), often nature provides a good starting point. In this case,
automaticrecognitionofcontextwithoutconsciousattention
seems to be a good idea, just as any other sort of “effort-
less” reasoning would be a good idea. Once the context is
identiﬁed, by whatever manner, it frees the agent from mak-
ing decisions about context at each choice point in behavior
until the context changes. And the ability to reason about
the context, which implies explicit context representation, is
also a good idea, since it allows learning about the context,
considering hypothetical situations (“If I were in the con-
text of riding a train, what kinds of things would I be able
to do to pass the time?”), and possibly merging knowledge
about multiple contexts to determine how to behave in novel
situations.
There have been many approaches to imbuing intelligent
agents with context-awareness. Context was taken into ac-
count, for example, by even the earliest planning programs
andrule-basedexpert systems; inthosesystems, context was
encoded as ﬁlter conditions and preconditions of operators
and as part of rule antecedents. These systems, however, al-
though dealing with explicit knowledge about context, dealt
with context itself implicitly. Except in rare systems, there
was no attempt to represent the context as an object in its
own right, and when there was such an attempt, the repre-
sentation was meager at best.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there began to be inter-
est in representing context explicitly, including work by the
author (Turner 1989), Br´ ezillon (Br´ ezillon et al. 1997), Mc-
Carthy (McCarthy 1995), Giunchiglia (Giunchiglia 1993)
and colleagues, and Guha (?). Research in this area in-
creased rapidly and began to be reported in the major AI
conferences, numerous workshops, and in the CONTEXT
(International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Model-
ing and Using Context) conference series.
Thispaperpresentsanoverviewoftheworkofourlabora-
tory1 on context-sensitive reasoning, which we call context-
mediated behavior (CMB) (Turner 1998). This approach
1The Maine Software Agents and Artiﬁcial Intelligence Labo-
ratory, MaineSAIL; MaineSAIL.umcs.maine.edu.relies on explicit context representation coupled with auto-
matic context recognition to provide an agent with informa-
tion about how to control all facets of its behavior. We ﬁrst
discuss our view of what context is, then our representation
mechanism, contextual schemas (c-schemas). We then de-
scribe one of the mechanisms we have used to organize and
retrieve c-schemas as needed, the process of selecting the
appropriate one(s) to use for a given situation, and how our
agent, Orca (Turner 1995), an intelligent controller for au-
tonomous underwater vehicles, makes use of the contextual
knowledge. We then look brieﬂy at some of our ongoing
work on context-sensitive reasoning for advanced planning
and multiagent systems.
Context
Context is an amazingly elusive thing to deﬁne, much less
represent, as has been evident from papers in and discus-
sions at the CONTEXT conferences. Some circumscribe
context very tightly, while others assert that a context is es-
sentially inﬁnite in scope. Consequently, authors are obliged
to deﬁne what they mean by context early in their papers.
We are no exception. In our approach to context-sensitive
reasoning, we use the term situation to mean the complete
state of the world and agent(s). We use the term context to
mean a class of situations, each with the same general im-
plications for an agent’s behavior. The process of situation
assessment, then, is that of assigning a situation to a partic-
ular known context.
This is a very imprecise deﬁnition, of course, but an intu-
itive one. For example, the situation might be that an AUV
is between Boston and Cambridge, it is July, and it has been
given the goal of collecting CTD (conductivity, temperature,
and depth) measurements. This situation would very likely
be an instance of several known contexts, including: oper-
ating in the Charles River; operating in summer; operating
in the Charles River in summer; taking CTD data; taking
CTD data in the Charles River; and so on. Which contexts
would be known about would depend on the AUV’s knowl-
edge base, which might in turn depend on its own history.
We can imagine the AUV selecting the most speciﬁc, say
performing data collection in the Charles River in summer,
and using that context to guide its behavior. This context
might suggest being very careful when surfacing or oper-
ating near the surface, given the likely presence of shells,
sailboats, etc.
Explicit Representation of Context
Our work is an outgrowth of early work on case-based rea-
soning, so it should be no surprise that our representation
scheme is similar. In fact, our context representation is much
like a generalized case: instead of representing a record of a
particular situation, it represents a generalization of a class
of cases (situations). We call these generalized cases con-
textual schemas,o rc-schemas for short.
The exact form and content of c-schemas is domain de-
pendent. Broadly, however, a c-schema contains two types
of information, descriptive and prescriptive. Descriptive in-
formation describes the context and entities expected to ap-
pear in it. In the AUV domain, for example, descriptive in-
formation in a c-schema would include information about
the physical setting; properties of the AUV speciﬁc to the
situation, including typical goals the agent has in the con-
text; the presence of other agents, if any; and any context-
speciﬁc meanings of concepts. A c-schema representing the
context of “being in a harbor,” C-HARBOR, might contain
information about:
• the setting: the water column is shallow, there is clutter
on the bottom, there is surface trafﬁc
• concepts: e.g., different membership functions to deﬁne
the fuzzy linguistic values associated with “depth” (“shal-
low”, “too deep”, etc.) (Turner 1997).
A c-schema needs to contain enough descriptive information
to allow the agent to identify the context by matching the c-
schema to the situation and to realize when the situation no
longer is an instance of the context represented.
The prescriptive information contained in a c-schema
speciﬁes how the agent should behave while in the context.
There are several kinds of such information. Event-handling
knowledge is needed to allow the agent to determine when
an event has occurred (recognition), what the event means
(diagnosis), how important it is (assessment), and what to
do about it (response). For example, in a harbor, a sonar
contact is likely to be with the shore, a vessel traveling on
the surface, or one that is docked or moored. In the context
of operating in a hostile harbor, however, a sonar contact
takes on a different, and possibly more sinister, meaning: it
could be a mine. How this is diagnosed and what to do about
it depends on the context. In this context, avoiding the mine
would likely be the best course, while in the context of a
demining mission, the response would be different (report it
or disable it).
Attention-focusing knowledge is needed to allow the agent
to appropriately and efﬁciently select what to work on at any
given time. This includes knowledge about which goals are
reasonable to pursue or not in the current context, as well
as the relative importance of particular goals. As noted be-
low, we are extending this kind information in current work
to include information about kinds of resources that might
be available, resource and time constraints that might be
present, etc.
The way goals should be achieved varies by context, and
so action-selection knowledge is needed to link goals to
appropriate methods for achieving them (called procedural
schemas, or p-schemas, in our approach). For example, in
most missions, localization goals and self-preservation goals
are important. However, in the context of rescuing a diver,
such goals are not as important: it wouldn’t make sense to
abandon the diver to take a GPS ﬁx, or even to respond to a
leak, unless the leak would incapacitate the AUV before it
could ﬁnish the rescue attempt.
Some aspects of behavior having little to do with goals
are also context-dependent. The example of lowering one’s
voice when entering a library or church falls into this cat-
egory. We call such behavioral parameter settings stand-
ing orders and represent them as part of the c-schema. For
example, an AUV entering a harbor should automaticallytighten its depth envelope (to avoid surface trafﬁc and bot-
tom clutter); when docking, it should disable obstacle avoid-
ance (or risk a very frustrating docking experience); and
wheninthepossiblepresenceofmines, itshouldslowdown.
Retrieving Contextual Schemas: Context
Assessment
The process of assessing the current context should be sep-
arate from the agent’s other reasoning processes. This not
only models automatic context recognition, in that it does
not interfere with or need be taken into account by the other
reasoning, but it also allows the context assessment process
to be used with a variety of reasoners.
In our approach, context assessment is a diagnostic pro-
cess analogous to medical differential diagnosis (Arritt &
Turner 2003b). Features of the agent and world take the
place of signs and symptoms, and c-schemas (the contexts)
take the place of diseases. This is reasonable, as the process
of medical diagnosis has as its result the recognition that the
patient is in the context of having a particular disease. In
medical diagnosis, recognizing the disease allows the doctor
to treat it; for an intelligent artiﬁcial agent, recognizing the
context allows the agent to know how to behave appropri-
ately.
We borrow from the work in AI in medicine for con-
text assessment. In particular, we use an abductive differ-
ential diagnosis model based on that used in INTERNIST-
I/CADUCEUS (Miller, Pople, & Myers 1982).
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Figure 1: Context management in Orca. (From [Turner,
1998].)
Figure 1 shows the process of context assessment. The
process starts when features of the current situation evoke
particular hypotheses about what the context might be. Al-
though the evocation can be done in any manner, we use
a conceptual memory based loosely on Kolodner’s CYRUS
program (Kolodner 1984; Lawton, Turner, & Turner 1999).
Such a memory is content-addressable: features of the situ-
ation are presented to the memory as a probe, and the mem-
ories indexing structures are traversed based on those fea-
tures and second-order elaborated features to ﬁnd the set of
the most closely-matching (most speciﬁc) c-schemas. The
c-schemas returned are marked with how strongly they are
evoked by the situation.
Once a candidate set of c-schemas is found, then they
are partitioned into logical competitor sets (Feltovich et al.
1984). Loosely, each LCS contains those hypotheses that
explain the same set of features in the environment. The hy-
potheses are ranked, based on the evoking strengths and on
successful and violated predictions about the situation. The
topmost LCS is then examined more closely to see if there
is any additional information that will allow it to be reduced
to a single hypothesis. Additional reasoning may be needed
at this point, and, in the worst case, some actions may need
to be taken, requiring the assessment process to interact with
the agent’s reasoning mechanism. Once the topmost LCS is
“solved,” features explained by it are marked as such, new
LCSs are created based on any new information found, and
the process continues.
The process terminates with a set of c-schemas that each
ﬁt the situation. At this point, the c-schemas are merged to
form a coherent picture of the current context. In this way,
existing c-schemas can be combined to represent novel con-
texts. For example, if an AUV is on a sampling mission
near Georges Bank, there are whales nearby, there is surface
trafﬁc (from whale-watching boats), and power is low, then
the AUV may in fact be in a novel context. However, there
may be c-schemas that ﬁt the situation: operating in shal-
low water, surface trafﬁc present, low power, on a sampling
mission, and possibly even operating around whales. These
can then be combined to form a representation of the current
context from which behavioral information can be obtained.
Using Contextual Knowledge
Although representation and retrieval of contextual knowl-
edge are very important aspects of context-sensitive reason-
ing, the context management process must still be integrated
into the agent’s overall reasoning process. We take the ap-
proach of having a separate context management module,
CONMAN, that can interact with the agent’s other reasoning
modules.2
Figure 1 shows how CONMAN is integrated into the Orca
AUV control agent. Other agent modules can register with
the context manager to be apprised of new contextual knowl-
edge when the context changes, or they can query CONMAN
to obtain the knowledge as needed.
In addition, recent work has focused on augmenting CON-
MAN to allow it to function as a working memory for those
agents, such as Orca, that need that functionality. In this
way, the agent’s view of its current situation is automati-
cally colored by the context, for example, by having highly-
predicted features of the world show up in working mem-
ory, marked with the appropriate degree of belief, without
the agent having observed or otherwise inferred them.
CONMAN can be used with other kinds of systems that
do not have the ability to query for contextual knowledge
nor need a working memory. For example, we have used
our context-management approach to automatically provide
context-appropriate weights and network structure for a neu-
ral net (Arritt & Turner 2003a). One could imagine using
2The older, published name was ECHO, for “embedded context
handling object,” but we found the new name irresistible.CONMANto provide context-dependent search heuristics for
a problem-solving or game-playing agent, constraint-based
heuristics for constraint-based reasoners, operators for plan-
ners, or rule sets for rule-based systems.3
Status and Future Work
Currently, most of the context-mediated behavior approach
outlined in this paper has been implemented in the Orca
AUV control agent. CONMAN is currently undergoing re-
design to make it a more complete working memory for
Orca.
In addition, current work is focused on merging c-
schemas, which is a very difﬁcult problem. If knowledge
from two (or more) c-schemas does not conﬂict about some-
thing, say how to handle an event, then there is no problem.
However, the information could conﬂict, either completely
(e.g., surface versus land on the bottom) or partially (e.g.,
change the sonar rate to twice per second versus twice per
minute). Indeed, even detecting a conﬂict may be difﬁcult.
Merging contextual knowledge is the topic of PhD disserta-
tion work in our lab.
Context also comes into play in another project in our lab
focused on selecting the appropriate level of commitment to
actions and goals during continuous (on-line) planning (Al-
bert, Turner, & Turner ). In this project, resources, location,
and other important features of the situation organize goals
and actions so that the agent can know when the schedule
new goals and actions in the evolving template for its future
actions. We envision context coming into play here, both in
providing appropriate heuristics for organizing and in help-
ing to specify the organizing features that are appropriate in
the situation.
A major focus of our work is on multiagent systems, in
particular organizing and reorganizing heterogeneous, open
MASs such as autonomous oceanographic sampling net-
works (AOSNs) (Curtin et al. 1993; Turner & Turner 2001).
We are currently exploring the use of our context-mediated
behavior approach to help select appropriate organizational
structures.
The basic idea is the same: contexts encode classes of sit-
uations, but in this case, some encode situations involving a
MAS. These contain as part of their prescriptive information
knowledge about which organizational structure is appropri-
ate for the situation. This allows features of the situation to
be used to automatically ﬁnd starting points for organization
design. For example, if the situation is one in which there is
little an agent can expect to know about other agents, then
the corresponding c-schema may suggest a kind of market-
based approach, such as some variant of the contract net pro-
tocol (Smith 1980). Alternatively, if the situation is one in
which communication is limited, yet global coherence is re-
quired, then the corresponding c-schema may suggest some
sort of hierarchical organization. When multiple c-schemas
ﬁt the situation—i.e., the situation is an instance of more
than one known context or, equivalently, it is an instance
of a novel context—then the c-schema merger process will
3This would be similar in some respects to early AI in medicine
work that partitioned rule sets (Chandrasekaran et al. 1979).
have to merge organizational structures. This might result in
a novel structure, or it might result in a hybrid structure, for
example, an overall hierarchy with contracting done in some
“departments.”
There are several open questions in this research. For ex-
ample, who should be responsible for assessing the context
in a MAS, a single agent, a subset of the MAS, or the MAS
as whole? Also, if several agents each assess the context in-
dependently, then how can they negotiate to agree on what
the context is?
Conclusion
Context-mediated behavior is one approach to context-
sensitive reasoning. It relies on explicitly representing not
only contextual knowledge, but also contexts themselves as
ﬁrst-class objects that can be reasoned about. This allows
retrieval of all knowledge about a context by matching the
current situation to one or more known context representa-
tions (c-schemas), which contain the contextual knowledge.
The contextual knowledge can then be used to make pre-
dictions about the current situation and to prescribe how the
agent should behave while in the context. By separating the
context-assessment process from the agent’s other reason-
ing, we achieve three things: the automatic (from the per-
spective of the other reasoning) assessment of context, with
the concomitant automatic retrieval of knowledge about how
to behave; the ability focus research on the context assess-
ment process itself, irrespective of the agent, including how
to have the process learn from experience; and the ability
easily to add contextual reasoning to agents that would not
ordinarily be able to do explicit context assessment (e.g.,
neural networks).
The work has been and is being implemented in Orca,
an intelligent controller for AUVs and other autonomous in-
telligent agents. However, we believe that the approach is
generic and will be appropriate for a wide range of single-
agent and multiagent systems.
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